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I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, so-called rape shield laws date back to the 1970s.
These laws limit the type of evidence a criminal defendant may introduce
with respect to an alleged victim in criminal sexual conduct cases. The
purpose of such laws is to afford criminal sexual conduct victims
“heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary
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invasions of privacy.” 1 In 1974, Michigan became the first state to enact a
rape shield law, 2 followed in the same year by Iowa, 3 Florida 4 and
California. 5 By 1998, 6 all fifty states and the federal government 7 had some
form of rape shield law on their books. 8 Minnesota enacted its first version
of a rape shield law in 1975. 9 Since its enactment, Minnesota’s rape shield
law 10 has been amended several times and recodified. 11
In the years since they were enacted, many states’ rape shield laws have
been challenged on several legal bases, most commonly as infringements of
defendants’ rights under the Fifth 12 and Sixth Amendments 13 to the United
States Constitution, 14 which guarantee fair trials, the right to a complete
* J.D., Hamline University School of Law, 2012. Ms. Zauhar is an associate partner with
Halberg Criminal Defense in Bloomington, Minnesota. She practices exclusively in the area
of criminal defense.
** J.D., Hamline University School of Law, 1995. Mr. Jonas is a non-practicing research and
writing specialist with Halberg Criminal Defense in Bloomington, Minnesota.
1
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991).
2
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.520j (2019).
3
See IOWA R. EVID. 5.412.
4
See FLA. STAT. § 794.022(2) (2019).
5
See CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 782, 1103(c)(2).
6
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13–1421; UTAH R. EVID. 412 (Utah (1994) and Arizona (1998)
were the last two states to enact rape shield laws).
7
FED. R. EVID. 412.
8
See Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The Traditional Common Law and
Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 121 (1999).
9
See 1975 Minn. Laws 1244.
10
MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2019); See also MINN. R. EVID. 412.
11
See State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 750 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied
(Minn. Apr. 18, 1991) (holding the rape shield law was originally codified as Rule 404(c) in
the Minnesota Rules of Evidence, however, effective January 1, 1990, the rule was amended
and redesignated as Rule 412 of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence).
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
13
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”).
14
The mandates of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to the states through the
incorporation doctrine and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Rabe
v. Washington, 405 U.S. 313, 315 (1972); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 787 (1969);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18
(1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405
(1965).
12
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defense, and the right to confront adverse witnesses. 15 Minnesota courts have
long recognized the constitutional implications that invoking rape shield
holds for a defendant charged with criminal sexual conduct. 16 Yet, despite
the courts’ acknowledgment of these constitutional pitfalls, they have
consistently and overwhelmingly found that an alleged victim’s interest in
shielding his or her previous sexual conduct outweighs a defendant’s
constitutional right to present a complete defense and to confront adverse
witnesses. 17 In some cases, courts have allowed their approach in applying
rape shield to slip beyond the boundaries of statutory language and,
intentionally or not, expanded the scope of the law to include acts that would
appear excluded by the plain language of the statute. Although the
Minnesota Supreme Court has waded into the waters of rape shield a
handful of times since the turn of the twenty-first century, it is apparent from
lower courts’ decisions that application of rape shield has become no less
muddied and one-sided than it was in the 1980s. 18 In fact, over the last
twenty-five years, Minnesota’s law has become more of a sword in the hands
of prosecutors, hacking away at defendants’ ability to mount a defense, than
a shield to protect alleged victims’ sexual history from scrutiny.
This article will argue that, while rape shield laws serve a legitimate and
important purpose in protecting victims from unnecessary and embarrassing
disclosures, in the current climate of “#metoo” revelations and college
tribunals that do not adhere to constitutional or evidentiary safeguards, it is
more important than ever to ensure that defendants’ Fifth and Sixth
See Rabe, 405 U.S. at 315 (mandating the Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to the states
through the incorporation doctrine and the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Benton, 395 U.S. at 787; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 148; Washington, 388
U.S. at 18; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467; Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405; David Haxton, Rape Shield
Statutes: Constitutional Despite Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 WIS. L. REV.
1219 (1985).
See State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (explaining that rape shield laws
limit the admission of evidence of a victim’s prior sexual conduct and the right to present
evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by rape shield laws).
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982) (stating that when determining
whether to admit evidence of the victim’s prior sexual conduct, courts balance the state’s
interest in guarding the victim’s privacy against the accused’s constitutional rights under rape
shield laws).
See State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306–07 (Minn. 2015) (“The State should not have
introduced evidence indicating that A.F. was sexually inexperienced . . . and the district court
abused its discretion by allowing it to do so. The rape-shield law applies equally to evidence
offered by the prosecution and the defense [as per Minnesota Statutes section 609.347,
subdiv. 3 (2019)].”); see, e.g., State v. Calbero, 785 P.2d 157, 161–62 (Haw. 1989); People
v. Sandoval, 552 N.E.2d 726, 730–31 (Ill. 1990); State v. Gavigan, 330 N.W.2d 571, 576
(Wis. 1983).
15

16

17

18
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Amendment rights are preserved in criminal court proceedings. While the
language of Minnesota’s rape shield law may pass constitutional muster, the
consistent manner in which courts have applied rape shield to infringe on
defendants’ due process and confrontation rights is constitutionally suspect.
Moreover, courts appear to have expanded application of rape shield
beyond the language of the statute itself and have yet to be meaningfully
challenged for doing so. 19 Thus, the time has come for either appellate
courts or the Minnesota Legislature to examine the application of rape
shield and offer more precise guidance to lower courts to ensure that
defendants receive a fair trial, are afforded the opportunity to present a
complete defense, and are given a meaningful opportunity to confront the
witnesses against them.
II. RAPE SHIELD IN MINNESOTA: MINN. STAT. § 609.347 AND
MINN. R. EVID. 412
Minnesota’s rape shield statute and corresponding rule of evidence
provide, in pertinent part, that:
In a prosecution under [statutes prohibiting criminal sexual
conduct], 20 evidence of the victim's previous sexual conduct shall
not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made
in the presence of the jury, except by court order under the
procedure provided in subdivision 4. 21 The evidence can be
admitted only if the probative value of the evidence is not
substantially outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature
and only in the circumstances set out in paragraphs (a) 22 and (b) 23.

19

See State v. Lipe, No. A18-1985, 2019 WL 4745325 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).
When such a challenge has been presented, appellate courts have declined the invitation.
See, e.g., id. (declining to address appellant’s challenge to construe the rape shield law as not
applicable to subsequent sexual conduct).
20
See MINN. STAT. §§ 609.342–609.3451, 609.3453, 609.365 (2019).
21
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 4(a). “A motion shall be made by the accused at least
three business days prior to trial, unless later for good cause shown, setting out with
particularity the offer of proof of the evidence that the accused intends to offer, relative to
the previous sexual conduct of the victim.”
22
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(i)-(ii). “When consent of the victim is a defense in the
case, the following evidence is admissible: (i) evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct
tending to establish a common scheme or plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances
similar to the case at issue. In order to find a common scheme or plan, the judge must find
that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were fabricated; and (ii)
evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct with the accused.”
23
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b). “When the prosecution’s case includes evidence of
semen, pregnancy, or disease at the time of the incident or, in the case of pregnancy, between
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For the evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection
(i), the judge must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
the facts set out in the accused's offer of proof are true. For the
evidence to be admissible under paragraph (a), subsection (ii) or
paragraph (b), the judge must find that the evidence is sufficient
to support a finding that the facts set out in the accused's offer of
proof are true, as provided under Rule 901 of the Rules of
Evidence. 24
Courts have characterized the Minnesota rape shield statute as
“serv[ing] to emphasize the general irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history,
not to remove relevant evidence from the jury’s consideration.” 25 This
description of rape shield is generous because it is an ideal characterization
of how the law should work if it were applied consistently and with the
appropriate counterbalancing of defendants’ constitutional rights. The
idealistic depiction of rape shield in Wenthe and other cases fails to reflect
how the law has been applied in Minnesota courts to the detriment of
defendants.
Rape shield “is not a law in the same sense as laws prohibiting theft [or
other crimes].” 26 Rather, it is a legislative limitation of a citizen’s Sixth
Amendment right to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses. 27 To
the extent that it hinders a defendant’s ability to mount a complete defense,
rape shield also places a limitation on a defendant’s due process right to a
fair trial. 28 In spite of creating a law that courts have clearly recognized as a
curtailment of a defendant’s constitutional rights, it is presumed that
“[t]he legislature does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United
States or of [Minnesota].” 29 Therefore, rather than simply striking down rape
the time of the incident and trial, evidence of specific instances of the victim’s previous sexual
conduct is admissible solely to show the source of the semen, pregnancy, or disease.”
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2019); see also MINN. R. EVID. 412(1) (“In a
prosecution for acts of criminal sexual conduct, including attempts or any act of criminal
sexual predatory conduct, evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall not be
admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the presence of the jury, except
by court order under the procedure provided in rule 412. Such evidence can be admissible
only if the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by its inflammatory
or prejudicial nature . . .”).
25
State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306 (Minn. 2015) (quoting State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d
860, 867 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan. 23, 1996)) (internal citations
omitted).
26
State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 628 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May
15, 2002).
24

27
28
29

Id.
Id. at 627.
MINN. STAT. § 645.17(3) (2019).
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shield as unconstitutional, courts have been forced to enunciate a balancing
test that purports to protect a defendant’s constitutional rights in the face of
rape shield. Citing the Minnesota Supreme Court’s opinion in Friend, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals explained:
In ruling on a defendant’s offer of [evidence that may be
prohibited under rape shield], the trial court considers the
defendant’s constitutional rights, Minn. R. Evid. 403 and 412, and
the rape shield statute . . . . In the event of a conflict, the
defendant’s constitutional rights require admission of evidence
excluded by the rape shield law. 30
Although the Friend balancing test appears to hold paramount a
defendant’s constitutional rights, it has been a rare case, indeed, in which a
court of any level has found that either rape shield or Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 403 has conflicted with such rights. 31 Rule 403, which corresponds
with the federal rule of the same number, provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence. 32
Thus, even if evidence of an alleged victim’s conduct may otherwise be
admissible under rape shield, a defendant must also overcome the burden
of proving that such evidence is more probative than prejudicial before it
can be introduced. Beyond proving the probative value of proffered
evidence, a defendant bears the further burden of demonstrating that such
evidence is truthful. 33 The court of appeals offered the following explication
in State v. Davis: “The Constitution will tolerate a rule or statute requiring
the trial court to make a threshold finding of veracity as a predicate to the
admission of a criminal defendant’s highly probative, but exceedingly
prejudicial evidence.” 34 Hence, under current Minnesota law: (1) evidence
of an alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct must be more probative than
prejudicial; (2) a court must find a defendant’s proffer of such evidence to
be truthful; and (3) the evidence must fall within one of the recognized
exceptions to rape shield.
30
31
32

Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 866 (citing State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992)).
Carroll, 639 N.W.2d at 623.

MINN. R. EVID. 403.
State v. Kobow, 466 N.W.2d 747, 751 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), review denied (Minn. Apr.
18, 1991).
34
State v. Davis, 546 N.W.2d 30, 35 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. May 21,
1996).
33
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In addition to those contained in the statute, several exceptions to rape
shield have been carved out in caselaw: when exclusion of evidence would
conflict with the defendant’s constitutional rights; exculpatory evidence
when the defendant denies contact with the complainant; evidence of a
complainant’s predisposition to fabricate charges; evidence of a source of a
complainant’s sexual knowledge other than the defendant; or the evidence
does not relate to “sexual conduct” due to the young age of the
complainant. 35
III. EXCEPTIONS TO RAPE SHIELD

A. Statutory Exceptions
The rape shield statute contains a few enumerated exceptions to its
own mandate that apply in very limited circumstances. 36 In cases where
consent of the victim is at issue, the defense may present “evidence of the
victim’s previous sexual conduct tending to establish a common scheme or
plan of similar sexual conduct under circumstances similar to the case at
issue, relevant and material to the issue of consent.” 37 In order to prove a
common scheme or plan existed under this exception, however, “the judge
must find that the victim made prior allegations of sexual assault which were
fabricated.” 38 In other instances where the defendant alleges that the
complainant consented, he or she may present “evidence of the victim’s
previous sexual conduct with the accused.” 39
A final statutory exception exists in cases where the prosecution
intends to introduce evidence of “semen, pregnancy, or disease.” 40 In such
cases, a defendant’s ability to introduce evidence to bolster his or her
version of events is limited only to specific instances of the complainant’s
previous sexual conduct that may offer alternative sources for the semen, a
pregnancy that occurred between the time of the alleged incident and the
trial, or a disease that was present at the time of the alleged offense. 41
Absent these enumerated exceptions, the mandate of rape shield
appears absolute: “[E]vidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct shall
35

See infra Part III.

36

MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2018).
MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(i).
38
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(i) (2019).
39
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(a)(ii); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(A)(ii).
40
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b) (2019); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B).
41
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3(b); MINN. R. EVID. 412(1)(B).
37
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not be admitted nor shall any reference to such conduct be made in the
presence of the jury.” 42 As noted earlier, however, such an absolute
limitation on a defendant’s ability to mount a complete defense or confront
witnesses runs afoul of the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. 43
Courts have, therefore, carved an exception to the law when rape shield
conflicts with a defendant’s constitutional rights.

B. Exclusion of Evidence Under Rape Shield Would Conflict With a
Defendant’s Constitutional Rights
A defendant’s due process rights and protections under the Sixth
Amendment may require a court to admit evidence otherwise barred by
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412 and Minnesota Statutes, section 609.347.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals explained as much in Carroll: “In certain
cases the due process clause, the right to confront accusers, or the right to
present evidence will require admission of evidence otherwise excluded by
the rape shield law.” 44 In such cases, then, despite the statute’s absolute
language, the rape shield law must give way to a defendant’s rights.
Although the broad mandate of the state’s rape shield law appears
unyielding in its black letter form, Minnesota courts have held that:
[e]very criminal defendant has a right to fundamental fairness and
to be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense. The Due Process Clauses of the Federal and Minnesota
Constitutions require no less. The right to present a defense
includes the opportunity to develop the defendant's version of the
facts, so the jury may decide where the truth lies. The
Confrontation Clauses of the Federal and Minnesota
Constitutions serve the same purpose, affording a defendant the
opportunity to advance his or her theory of the case by revealing
an adverse witness's bias or disposition to lie. 45
Therefore, the scope of rape shield is, in fact, limited to the extent that
it may conflict with the constitutional rights of a defendant in a criminal
sexual conduct case. To this end, “Minnesota appellate courts have
recognized that [evidence of an alleged victim’s previous sexual conduct] is
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3; see MINN. R. EVID. 412(1).
MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6; see supra notes 12–15 and accompanying text.
State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. May
15, 2002); see also State v. Friend, 493 N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992) (citing State v.
Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986)) (“In certain cases the due process clause, the
right to confront accusers, or the right to present evidence will require admission of evidence
otherwise excluded by the rape shield law.”) (emphasis added).
State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review denied (Minn. Jan.
23, 1996) (internal citations and punctuation omitted).
42
43
44

45
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also admissible in all cases in which admission is constitutionally required
by the defendant's right to due process, his right to confront his accusers, or
his right to offer evidence in his own defense.” 46
Given the numerous judicial statements regarding the importance of
protecting a defendant’s constitutional rights and courts’ apparent
willingness to eviscerate rape shield should it conflict with such rights, one
struggles to see how rape shield has not been overturned as unconstitutional.
Minnesota courts, however, see rape shield and the Constitution as existing
harmoniously, even though the courts have acknowledged that “a rule that
excludes material evidence for reasons of policy will, by definition, run afoul
of defendants’ fundamental rights.” 47
The court of appeals explained this apparent contradiction thusly:
“[W]e conclude the rape shield statute serves to emphasize the general
irrelevance of a victim’s sexual history, not to remove relevant evidence
from the jury’s consideration . . . . Viewed from this perspective, the statute’s
relationship with the Constitution becomes one of harmony not tension.” 48
The court perceives harmony between rape shield and the
Constitution “because it serves to remind the bench that the victim’s sexual
history is normally irrelevant in a sexual assault prosecution.” 49 The fact that
a statute is a reminder for a concept of which judicial notice has already
been taken seems an insufficient reason not to strike down a law that “by
definition run[s] afoul of defendants’ fundamental rights.” 50
The Crims court went on to state that “evidence of sexual activity
with third persons cannot withstand a Rule 403 weighing unless special
circumstances enhance its probative value.” 51 Even in the absence of rape
shield, then, unless a defendant can show that a “victim’s sexual history is
relevant to the facts at bar,” it is a “form of character evidence that simply is
not admissible under the normal rules of evidence.” 52 The “special”
circumstances identified by the Crims court include “situations in which the
evidence explains a physical fact in issue at trial, suggests bias or ulterior
motive, or establishes a pattern of behavior clearly similar to the conduct at
issue.” 53
State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012), review denied (Minn. Feb.
27, 2013) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted) (citing Benedict, 397 N.W.2d at341).
47
Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 867.
48
Id. (citations omitted).
46

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 868.
52
Id.
53
Id. (citing United States v. Kasto, 584 F.2d 268, 271 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978)).
50
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Despite courts’ recognition of the potential for rape shield to conflict
with the constitutional rights of defendants, they rarely, as will be argued
later, find such conflict to exist. 54 One of the few exceptions to rape shield
regularly applied by courts, however, is when evidence of previous sexual
conduct can exonerate a defendant who denies having had contact with the
complainant. 55

C. Exculpatory Evidence When a Defendant Denies Contact With a
Complainant
In cases where an individual’s defense against criminal sexual conduct
charges rests on the premise that the defendant did not have sexual conduct
with the alleged victim, courts will allow evidence of the complainant’s
sexual conduct to the extent that it excludes the defendant as a perpetrator
of the offense. 56 As the Minnesota Court of Appeals put it, “Where the
defendant claims to have had no contact with the complainant, we do not
think rule 404(c)(1) [now 412] 57 was intended to bar the admission of
evidence which is ‘directly relevant to negate the act with which the
defendant is charged.’” 58 Rather, according to the court, the goal of rape
shield “is to limit evidence of the complainant's unrelated prior sexual
conduct when consent is raised as a defense.” 59 The exculpatory evidence
exception applies even in cases where “[i]t is clear” that the evidence a
defendant seeks to introduce is “not admissible under the limited
exceptions” outlined in the language of the rape shield statute itself or Rule
412. 60
In enunciating this exception to rape shield, the Hagen court cited to
a Washington Court of Appeals opinion that held, essentially:
[W]here the defendant denies any sexual contact with the victim,
yet the post-rape medical tests show evidence of a recent sexual
contact, then all recent sexual contacts which could account for

54
55

Infra Part IV.
See infra Section II.C.

56

State v. Hagen, 391 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), review denied (Minn. Oct.
17, 1986).
57
MINN. R. EVID., 404(c) (renumbered to MINN. R. EVID. 412). See supra note 11.
58
Hagen, 391 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting Commonwealth v. Majorana, 470 A.2d 80, 81 (Pa.
1983)).
59
Id. (citing State v. Larson, 389 N.W.2d 872 (Minn. 1986)).
60

Id.
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those testing results become highly relevant on the issue of
defendant's responsibility for the crime. 61
The rationale for the exculpatory evidence exception was stated
succinctly by a panel of the Minnesota Court of Appeals in a recent,
unpublished opinion: “[T]he rape-shield law was not intended to bar the
admission of exculpatory evidence of DNA testing of semen indicating that
it was ‘most probably not’ [the defendant’s, and defendant] claimed that he
had no contact with the complainant.” 62 Similarly, the court of appeals has
held that evidence establishing a complainant’s fabrication of charges may
not be barred by the rape shield laws.

D. Evidence of a Complainant’s Predisposition to Fabricate Charges
As with evidence that exculpates a defendant when he or she denies
having contact with an alleged victim, courts should admit evidence that
tends to establish a complainant’s propensity to fabricate an allegation
despite the broad prohibitions of Rule 412 and section 609.347. In 1989,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals opined that “evidence not fitting the two
exceptions of Rule 404(c) 63 nonetheless may be admissible under recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decisions which recognized that the admission
of certain evidence may be constitutionally required.” 64 Thus, any evidence
tending to establish a complainant’s predisposition to fabricate criminal
sexual conduct charges should be admitted unless its potential for unfair
prejudice outweighs its probative value. 65 In addition, evidence about a
complainant’s knowledge regarding sexual matters may also be admitted in
spite of rape shield’s bar. 66

E. Evidence of a Complainant’s Source of Sexual Knowledge Other Than
the Defendant
In certain cases, the prosecution may allege that a complainant is so
young or otherwise inexperienced that his or her source of sexual
knowledge could only have come from the perpetrator of the offense or
Hagen, 391 N.W.2d at 892 (citing State v. Cosden, 568 P.2d 802, 806 (Wash. Ct. App.
1977)).
62
State v. Morales, No. A15-0101, 2016 WL 456791, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 8,
2016), review denied (Minn. Apr. 27, 2016).
63
MINN. R. EVID. 404(c) (renumbered to MINN. R. EVID. 412). See supra note 11.
64
State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Dec.
20, 1989) (citing State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982)).
61

65

66

Id.
Id. at 205.
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offenses against the complainant. 67 In such cases, a defendant should be
permitted, despite the prohibition of rape shield, to introduce “[e]vidence
tending to establish a source of knowledge of or familiarity with sexual
matters . . . in cases where the jury might otherwise infer that the defendant
was the source.” 68 This is because “sexual history evidence ‘establish[es] a
source of knowledge or familiarity with sexual matters in circumstances in
which lack of knowledge is the likely inference to be drawn by the fact
finder.’” 69
Recently, however, the Minnesota Supreme Court intimated that this
particular rape shield exception is limited. In Wenthe, the court noted that
“a complainant’s source of [sexual] knowledge becomes relevant only when
the defendant asserts that the complainant fabricated the sexual conduct.” 70
Wenthe is the Minnesota Supreme Court’s most recent opinion
addressing rape shield in any detail, and the court’s statement creates some
overlap between the source of sexual knowledge and fabrication exceptions
to the rule. 71 The court initially recognized the exception related to an
alleged victim’s propensity to fabricate charges in Caswell. 72 Several year
later in the Benedict decision, the court recognized the “sexual knowledge
exception.” 73 In its Kroshus 74 opinion, the court of appeals appears to have
continued its treatment of these exceptions as separate and distinct from
one another. One could imagine a scenario in which a complainant’s source
of sexual knowledge would be relevant even absent completely fabricated
charges. For example, in cases where the complainant’s memory or ability
to identify the defendant is in question, other evidence of his or her sexual
knowledge may be relevant to demonstrate that the defendant was not the
source of such knowledge. 75 The question of sexual knowledge is one that
often arises in cases involving minor alleged victims, as children presumably
would not have the same level or type of sexual knowledge that an adult
would. 76 When examining the source of knowledge or “sexual” experience
67
68

See, e.g., id.
Id. (citing State v. Benedict, 397 N.W.2d 337, 341 (Minn. 1986)).

State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 307 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Harriett R. Galvin, Shielding
Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second Decade, 70 MINN.
69

L. REV. 763, 866 (1986)).
70

Id.
Id.
72
See State v. Caswell, 320 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn. 1982).
73
See Benedict, 397 N.W.2d at 341.
71

74

State v. Kroshus, 447 N.W.2d 203, 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
See, e.g., State v. Woods, No. A10-1076, 2011 WL 2302105, at *9 (Minn. Ct. App. June
13, 2011).
76
See, e.g., Bean v. State, 432 S.W.3d 87, 94 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014); State v. Jones, 43 N.E.3d
833, 854 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
75
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in young complainants, it is important to examine whether the behavioral
evidence a defendant is trying to introduce is sexual conduct per se. 77 If such
behavior is not sexual conduct, then it should not be barred by rape shield.

F. The Evidence Does Not Relate to “Sexual Conduct” Due to the Young
Age of the Complainant
It is common for children to engage in anatomical exploration with
themselves or other children. In fact, sexual exploration is a normal
behavior for children under the age of ten. 78 However, under the law, sexual
intent is required before behavior can be deemed sexual in nature. 79
Minnesota law implies that children under the age of ten cannot form
criminal intent— therefore, these children cannot engage in criminal sexual
conduct under the law. 80 This is presumably an extension of the common
law defense of infancy, under which children were presumed unable to form
the requisite intent to commit a crime. 81 Because a child under ten cannot
legally form sexual intent, childhood exploration cannot be called “sexual
history” or the type of “sexual conduct” proscribed by the rape shield law.
In Minnesota, courts have defined “sexual intent” with the phrase’s
common usage: “[A]n act is committed with sexual intent when the actor
perceives himself to be acting based on sexual desire or in pursuit of sexual
gratification.” 82 Moreover, the need for establishing sexual intent in
conjunction with the offense behavior is “to avoid criminalizing contact that
is accidental or that serves an innocuous, non-sexual purpose.” 83 Thus,
establishing requisite sexual intent “negates the possibility of an innocent
explanation such as accidental touching or touching in the course of
caregiving.” 84
When a case involves a young complainant with a history of touching
him or herself and/or other children, it would be difficult for the State to
77

Jeanette R. Buttrey, Michigan's Rape-Shield Statute and the Admissibility of Evidence that
A Child Complainant Has Been Previously Molested, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 391, 392–
93 (1998).
William N. Friedrich et al., Normative Sexual Behavior in Children: A Contemporary
Sample, 101 PEDIATRICS 9 (1998).
79
State v. Austin, 788 N.W.2d 788, 792 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), review denied (Minn. Dec.
14, 2010).
80
Cf. In re S.A.C., 529 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (discussing the inability of
minors under the age of ten to form criminal intent for the purposes of prosecution).
81
MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018).
82
Austin, 788 N.W.2d at 792.
78

83
84

Id.
State v. Vick, 632 N.W.2d 676, 691 (Minn. 2001).
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demonstrate that such behavior was done out of “sexual desire or in pursuit
of sexual gratification.” 85 For this reason, sexual exploration or horseplay
among children under the age of ten is simply not sufficient to “negate . . .
the possibility of an innocent explanation.” 86 In contrast, similar contact
between an adult and a child would likely eliminate any possibility of an
innocent explanation. Because a minor complainant cannot be legally
capable of forming sexual intent, 87 within the context of Minnesota’s
criminal sexual conduct statutes, including rape shield, childhood sexual
exploration cannot be considered “previous sexual conduct.” 88 Thus, in
cases where a minor complainant has a history of engaging in explorational
sexual behavior that is similar to the offense conduct with which a defendant
is later charged—for example, a child who initiated exploratory touching with
other children and then attempted to engage in the same behavior with an
adult—the complainant’s previous pattern of behavior should not be
excluded by rape shield.
IV. THE RAPE SHIELD LAW HAS BEEN APPLIED AND
EXPANDED TO THE DETRIMENT OF DEFENDANTS’ RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Despite the numerous exceptions to rape shield and the law’s alreadybroad sweep, courts have rarely seen fit to favor a defendant’s constitutional
rights over the rule’s evidentiary prohibitions. 89 Moreover, in at least two
opinions, appellate courts appear to have stretched the law’s proscription
against evidence of “previous” sexual conduct to include evidence of
subsequent sexual conduct. 90 Prosecutors and courts have thus applied rape
shield in manners that hobble a defendant’s constitutional right to present a
complete defense.

A. Courts Regularly Fail to Adequately Weigh a Defendant’s

85
86
87

Austin, 788 N.W.2d at 792.
Vick, 632 N.W.2d at 691.

MINN. STAT. § 609.055 (2018).
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018).
89
Helim Kathleen Chun & Lindsey Love, Rape, Sexual Assault, and Evidentiary Matters, 14
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 593 (2013).
See infra note 102.
88

90
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Constitutional Rights
As noted previously, a defendant’s constitutional rights must be
considered when a court determines whether to bar evidence under the rape
shield law. 91
In ruling on a defendant’s offer of [evidence that may be prohibited
under rape shield], the trial court considers the defendant’s constitutional
rights, Minn. R. Evid. 403 and 412, and the rape shield statute… In the
event of a conflict, the defendant’s constitutional rights require admission
of evidence excluded by the rape shield law. 92
And yet, among the more than 450 Minnesota cases citing section
609.347 as of January 2020, the vast majority upheld application of rape
shield—often in spite of lengthy discussions regarding a defendant’s rights to
a fair trial under the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. 93 In the
Minnesota appellate cases that address the constitutional rights of a
defendant in the face of rape shield, courts have overwhelmingly decided
against the defendant. 94 Moreover, in cases where courts make only a passing
mention of the need to address the rights of a defendant whose proffered
evidence has been excluded by rape shield, the judges routinely rule in favor
of exclusion and find no violation of either the United States or Minnesota
Constitution. 95
Hundreds of Minnesota appellate cases that address rape shield have
made apparent that courts are willing to dismiss defendants’ fundamental
due process rights out-of-hand and exclude entire categories of evidence,
solely because the proffered evidence is excluded by an arbitrarily-applied
law that “by definition, run[s] afoul of defendants’ fundamental rights.” 96
The dearth of cases in which a defendant’s right to confront witnesses and
present a complete defense was held to outweigh the application of rape
shield makes this clear. On one rare occasion in which an appellate court
reversed a district court’s application of rape shield because it violated a
91
92

See supra Section III.B. See also U.S. CONST. amend. V, VI; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 6.

State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Friend, 493
N.W.2d 540, 545 (Minn. 1992)). See also State v. Carroll, 639 N.W.2d 623, 627 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2002).
93
See, e.g., State v. Enger, 539 N.W.2d 259, 262 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
94
See, e.g., State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 306–07 (Minn. 2015); Crims, 540 N.W.2d
at 866; Friend, 493 N.W.2d at 545. But see Carroll, 639 N.W.2d at 627 (reversing the lower
court’s decision to allow the victim to use the rape shield laws to avoid cross-examination).
See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, No. A17-0187, 2018 WL 4558151, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 24, 2018).
96
Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 867.
95
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defendant’s right to present a complete defense, 97 the decision was later
reversed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, which held that the lower
court’s abuse of discretion in applying rape shield to exclude the evidence
was harmless error. 98

B. Courts Have Applied Rape Shield Beyond the Plain Language of the
Statute
As noted previously, 99 the plain language of the rape shield statute bars
only “. . . evidence of the victim’s previous sexual conduct.” 100 In no place
does the statute’s language proscribing evidence refer to complainants’
conduct occurring after the alleged offense. 101 Although no Minnesota
appellate court has explicitly held that rape shield applies to subsequent
conduct, at least two cases imply, in dicta, that courts may be willing to apply
rape shield to subsequent conduct. 102 Moreover, West Publishing’s “Notes
of Decisions” affiliated with section 609.347 fuels this fire by including one
of the two decisions under the editorial heading “subsequent sexual
conduct.” 103
Yet, in the two decisions that may loosely be construed as having
addressed subsequent sexual conduct, neither court directly referred to
subsequent sexual conduct, nor was the issue raised by any party. 104 In Olsen,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals examined the relevance of a clinic visit
made by the complainant after the alleged offense conduct occurred. 105
Although it did so in the context of a rape shield ruling under section
609.347, the court did not make a specific ruling on the applicability of the
law to the clinic visit. 106 In fact, neither the appellant nor the respondent
addressed the issue of subsequent sexual conduct in their briefs. 107 Without
expressly holding as much, however, the appellate court’s eventual
affirmation of the lower court’s evidentiary ruling implied that rape shield
97

Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d at 235 (Minn. Ct. App. 2014) (“the district court abused its
discretion in precluding appellant from introducing evidence of [the complainant]'s sexual
history”), rev’d, 865 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 2015).
98
Id. at 308.
99
See supra section IV at ¶ 1.
100
MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018) (emphasis added).
101
102

Id.
See State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Crims, 540

N.W.2d 860, 865–67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
103
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2019).
See Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340; Crims, 540 N.W.2d at 865–67.
105
See Olsen, 824 N.W.2d at 340.
104

106
107

Id.
Id.
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would apply to subsequent sexual conduct. 108 In its holding, the Olsen court
relied on Crims, a case that also appears to imply that evidence of a
complainant’s subsequent sexual conduct is precluded by rape shield. 109
Similar to the Olsen panel, the court in Crims examined the relevance
of the defendant’s proffered evidence and not a challenge to the timing of
the complainant’s sexual conduct vis-à-vis the timing of the offense
conduct. 110 Nevertheless, the Crims opinion created an implication that rape
shield could be applied to exclude evidence of prostitution that occurred
after the time of the defendant’s alleged offense. 111 Rather than ruling that
such evidence was excluded by rape shield, the court held that, “[w]hen
unconnected to a pattern of pre-existing behavior, such evidence is remote
and uninstructive about the events underlying the rape charge.” 112 Even so,
Minnesota Statutes Annotated saw fit to include Crims in the “Notes of
Decisions” regarding section 609.347’s applicability to “subsequent sexual
conduct,” creating the dangerous potential for inference of a judiciallycreated expansion of rape shield’s plain language. 113 In at least one instance,
without citing to any authority, a district court explicitly found that rape
shield applies to subsequent sexual conduct. 114
However, applying rape shield to a complainant’s subsequent sexual
conduct flies in the face of the statute’s clear wording. The statute’s plain
language reads “previous”—not “subsequent” and not “prior.” 115 “When a
statute is completely silent on a contested issue, [courts] do not look beyond
the statutory text to discern its meaning unless there is an ‘ambiguity of
expression’ – rather than a failure of expression.” 116 There is no ambiguity
here; rather, absence of the word “subsequent” and the choice of the word
“previous” is either a clear meaning or a failure of expression.
108

Id. at 341.
Id. at 340.
110
See State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 865–67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
111
Id. at 867.
112
Id. at 869.
113
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, note 10.
See State v. Lipe, 10-CR-17-706 (Carver County) (Jun. 12, 2018), index no. 58, aff’d, No.
109

114

A18-1985, 2019 WL 474532 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2019).In reaching its conclusions on
the relevance of the evidence, the district court considered the rape shield statute and Rule
412, concluding that the “Rule has been applied to prior and subsequent sexual contact.” It
then found, without further reviewing the evidence or permitting further discovery, that the
evidence was irrelevant under Rule 403. Id.
115
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018); MINN. R. EVID. 412.
116
Toyota-Lift of Minn., Inc. v. Am. Warehouse Sys., LLC, 886 N.W.2d 208, 214 (Minn.
2016) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lennartson, 872 N.W.2d 524, 532 (Minn.
2015) (quoting Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 590 (Minn. 2012))).
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The legislature either saw fit to omit such language or overlooked it
when drafting section 609.347, but it cannot be implied in the statute by the
courts. A court “cannot supply that which the legislature purposely omits or
inadvertently overlooks.” 117 In fact, the interpretive canon expressio unius
est exclusion alterius—“expression of one thing is the exclusion of
another” 118—creates the presumption that the legislature’s omission of
“subsequent” or “prior” was, indeed, “by deliberate choice, not
inadvertence.” 119 This presumption becomes even stronger “when, as in this
case, a statute is uncommonly detailed and specific.” 120
The expressio unius canon applies to “associated groups and series . .
. .” 121 Here, section 609.347 does not define “previous sexual conduct” with
respect to its prohibition in subdivision 3. 122 However, later, in subdivision
5, the same statute clearly differentiates between “previous” and
“subsequent” sexual conduct when it prohibits certain jury instructions. 123
The plain language of the statute is unambiguous: “Previous” means
previous—and not subsequent—to the relevant offense conduct. Thus,
judicial application of rape shield to bar evidence of a complainant’s
subsequent conduct is not only improper, it violates a defendant’s right to
present evidence that is material and favorable to his or her theory of the
case. 124
Even if use of the word “previous” in section 609.347 and Rule 412 is
somehow ambiguous, the in pari materia canon sheds some light on what
the legislature intended by its choice of the word previous. 125 The in pari
materia canon “allows two statutes with a common purpose and subject
matter to be construed together to determine the meaning of ambiguous
statutory language.” 126 The purpose and “rationale for the canon is that
related statutes, although separate, should be considered as one systematic
body of law.” 127
State v. Wenthe, 865 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn. 2015) (quoting Wallace v. Comm'r
of
Taxation, 289 Minn. 220, 230, 184 N.W.2d 588, 594 (1971)).
118
117

State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 123 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Caldwell, 803 N.W.2d
373, 383 (Minn. 2011)).
119
Id. at 123 (quoting Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003)).
120
Id. at 123–24.
121
Id. at 123.
122
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 3 (2018).
123
See MINN. STAT. § 609.347, subdiv. 5(b) (2018).
124
See State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (collecting cases).
125
State v. Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d 432, 437 (Minn. 2017) (quoting State v. Lucas,
589 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Minn. 1999)).
126
Thonesavanh, 904 N.W.2d at 437 (quoting Lucas, 589 N.W.2d at 94).
127
Id. at 437–38 (quoting State v. Bolsinger, 221 Minn. 154, 160, 21 N.W.2d 480, 486
(1946)).
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Minnesota Statutes, section 609.3455, like section 609.347, addresses
criminal sexual conduct and is separated from the rape shield statute by only
two short, interceding sections. Thus, “they share the necessary common
purpose and subject matter for application of the in pari materia canon.” 128
The plain language of section 609.3455 provides that a “previous sex
offense conviction” means that the “offender was convicted . . . before the
commission of the present offense.” 129 By analogy, “previous sexual
conduct” would mean conduct which occurred “before the commission of
the present offense.” In contrast, a “prior sex offense conviction” means
conviction of a “sex offense before . . . [being] convicted of the present
offense.” 130 Had the legislature intended to exclude evidence of sexual
conduct that occurred subsequent to the charged conduct within the
meaning of section 609.347, it could have done so by using the word
“subsequent” in addition to “previous,” or by using the word “prior” instead
of “previous.” Yet, the legislature did no such thing.
When the legislature’s intent is clear from the statutory language,
statutory construction requires only a reading of the statute’s plain
meaning. 131 Application of the in pari materia and expressio unius canons
dictates that the legislature’s use of the word “previous” and its plain
meaning—“before commission of the present offense,”—is presumed to be
by deliberate choice. 132 Therefore, neither section 609.347 nor Rule 412 can
be applied to exclude evidence of a complainant’s conduct that occurred
after the date that an alleged offense was committed. Any inferences that
may be drawn from Crims or Olsen regarding rape shield’s application to
subsequent conduct must be disregarded, as neither case made such an
explicit holding; 133 and if they had, such holdings would have contradicted
the clear language that the legislature used in crafting Minnesota’s rape
shield law. 134

128

Id. at 438 (holding that theft and robbery share a common purpose and subject matter for
application of the canon).
129
MINN. STAT. § 609.3455, subdiv. 1(f) (2018) (emphasis added).
130
MINN. STAT. § 609.3455, subdiv. 1(g) (2018)
131
State v. Leathers, 799 N.W.2d 606, 608 (Minn. 2011).
See State v. Smith, 899 N.W.2d 120, 124 (Minn. 2017) (“the presence of a detailed and
exhaustive list of ‘prior impaired driving conviction[s]’ creates a presumption that the
omission of any criminal statutes, such as the criminal-vehicular-operation statute under
which Smith was convicted in 2005, was due to deliberate choice, not inadvertence”).
133
State v. Olsen, 824 N.W.2d 334 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Crims, 540 N.W.2d 860
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
134
MINN. STAT. § 609.347 (2018).
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V. CONCLUSION
Rape shield laws clearly serve an important purpose in the legal system,
and Minnesota’s version, codified in section 609.347 and rule 412, is no
exception. Rape shield laws not only prevent irrelevant, prejudicial evidence
from being considered by a jury, they also protect complainants’ reputations
and safeguard them from victim-blaming.
Courts have recognized, however, that rape shield laws represent a
significant curtailment of a defendant’s constitutional rights to confront
witnesses and to present a complete defense. For this reason, Minnesota
courts have carved out exceptions to rape shield’s broad prohibitions. An
exception that applies in every case is the need to balance the application of
rape shield against a defendant’s constitutional rights. Although the need to
do so is widely recognized, the balance very rarely falls in favor of the
defendant’s rights. When rape shield is invoked, the evidence that
prosecutors seek to ban is almost always excluded.
In the climate of recent times, a simple accusation of criminal sexual
conduct—with little or no evidence—can upend a defendant’s entire life.
While the social movement favoring increased belief of accusations of
sexual assault is undoubtedly important to societal growth, courts must
remain neutral and reasoned in their application of the Constitution for the
protection of accused persons against the immense powers of the
government in criminal proceedings. Therefore, it is more important than
ever for courts of law to consider the safeguards that the United States and
Minnesota Constitutions offer criminal defendants. Due process is a
guarantee, not an option.
The manner in which rape shield has been applied to exclude evidence
in Minnesota frequently appears to reflect an abundance of caution on the
part of courts, perhaps from a desire not to upset prosecutors or
complainants and their families, rather than a legitimate balancing of rape
shield’s purpose against the interests of justice and defendants’
constitutional rights. Moreover, this overwhelming tendency among courts
to favor rape shield’s proscriptions over a defendant’s constitutional rights
has created the inference that rape shield may be applied beyond the plain
language of section 609.347 and Rule 412. Instead of offering “heightened
protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of
privacy,” 135 in Minnesota, rape shield has become a means for prosecutors
to remove critical evidence in violation of the constitutional rights of
defendants while courts stand by in complicity.
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Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991).
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